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Abstract
Background: Brazil has experienced difficulties in attracting health professionals (especially doctors and nurses) to
practice at the primary health care (PHC) level and in rural and remote areas. This study presents two case studies,
each a current initiative in contracting for primary health services in Brazil: one for the state of Bahia and the other
for the city of Rio de Janeiro. The two models differ considerably in context, needs, modalities, and outcomes. This
article does not attempt to evaluate the initiatives but to identify their strengths and weaknesses.
Methods: Analysis was based on indicators produced by the Brazilian health care information systems, a review of
literature and other documentation, and key informant interviews.
Results: In the case of Bahia, the state and municipalities decided to create a State Foundation, a new institutional
public entity acting under private law that centralizes the hiring of health professionals in order to offer stable
positions with career plans and mobility within the state. Results have been mixed as a lower than expected
municipal involvement resulted in relatively high administrative costs and consequent default on municipal
financial contributions. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the municipality opted to contract not-for-profit Social
Organizations as it made a push to expand access to primary health care in the city. The approach has been
successful in expanding coverage, but evidence on cost and performance is weak.
Conclusions: Both cases highlight that improvements in cost and performance data will be critical for meaningful
comparative evaluation of delivery arrangements in primary care. Despite the different institutional and
implementation arrangements of each model, which make comparison difficult, the analysis provides important
lessons for contracting out health professionals for PHC within Brazil and elsewhere.
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Background
Over the last couple of decades, international experience
with contracting in the health sector has been growing.
Although there are significant differences in context and
processes behind these experiences, they have often been
motivated by a desire to improve quality and efficiency
of service delivery. The “traditional” model of service de-
livery through public sector providers, with salaried staff
on long-term contracts, has been seen as insufficiently
responsive or dynamic due to problems of low-powered
incentives, lack of management flexibility, and a bureau-
cratic institutional culture. In contrast, private sector en-
tities are often smaller and unconstrained by the myriad
of administrative rules and constraints of the public
sector. Hence, at least in principle, contracting can help
improve both quality and efficiency by combining man-
agement flexibility with more high-powered incentives.
Today, both for-profit and not-for-profit providers play
an important role in many health systems, in part be-
cause of the historic roots of these systems but also as a
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result of policy decisions to “autonomize” providers or
contract with the private sector as a means to improve
the performance of service delivery.
As the experience with contracting has grown, so has
the associated literature. Part of this literature is con-
cerned with the conditions under which contracting the
delivery of public services is likely to be effective, given
the uncertainty and information asymmetry that is per-
vasive in the health sector [3, 4, 6, 14]. There is also a
growing body of evidence on specific experiences, in-
cluding efforts to evaluate to what extent the perform-
ance of contracted service providers is superior to other
models for delivering services (see, e.g., [10–12, 15, 16]).
The globalization phenomena have changed signifi-
cantly the organization of health care systems on a glo-
bal basis. There is a concern about underperformance,
and many countries have undertaken reforms as an at-
tempt to remedy those situations. One of the major con-
cerns is related to health care personnel contracting
modalities, and experiences are very heterogeneous re-
garding design, implementation, and outcomes. In sum-
mary, the empirical evidence has shown the emergence
of three major strategies related to this issue: (1) con-
tractual relations based on delegation of responsibility,
including contracts delegating responsibility to private
actors, such as contracts for the devolution of a public
service; contracts relating to the concession of a geo-
graphical area, or public-private partnerships; contracts
binding the state and its autonomous institutions, in-
cluding internal contracting; (2) contractual relations
based on an act of purchase, such as the relations be-
tween fundholders and health service providers and
health service providers’ production processes; and (3)
contractual relations based on cooperation, such as weak
organizational interpenetration agreements (franchising,
collaboration between health care establishments and
voluntary associations, or strategic planning at the level
of the local health system and health networks) or strong
organizational interpenetration agreements (joint man-
agement and alliances).
Brazilian health care system
Brazil formally embarked on its path to universal health
care some 25 years ago with the creation of the Unified
Health System or SUS (Sistema Único de Saúde). Health
care as the right of the individual and duty of the state
was written into the 1988 constitution and was the cul-
mination of a broad-based reform process throughout
the 1980s that sought democratization and improved so-
cial rights. In particular, the “Sanitary Reform Movement”
(Movimento da Reforma Sanitária), an informal coalition
of health professionals, academics, and other civil society
actors, strove for a fundamental break from the prevailing
“curative privatizing model” that promoted expanded
social security coverage in favor of a “collective public
health model” built on the premise of universal access,
equity, integrality (comprehensiveness), decentralization,
and social participation.
The creation of the SUS unified health financing under
one integrated public system that increased and stabi-
lized public financing for health, while at the same time
decentralizing the responsibility of service delivery to
state and municipal levels. The health system is orga-
nized across the three levels of government: federal,
state, and municipal. Each level of government has a
health fund. At the federal level, the health fund is fi-
nanced by federal taxes and social security contributions
and is a major contributor (45 % in 2009) to the state
and municipal funds which are also funded by local rev-
enues. As of 2000, the state and the municipal govern-
ment are required to allocate a minimum of 12 % and
15 %, respectively, of their overall budgets to health care,
although no such provision exists at the federal level [9].
The political decision to reorient and reorganize health
care delivery toward a more comprehensive primary
health care approach resulted in significant expansion of
services, particularly the outpatient network at the mu-
nicipal level. This was achieved by the creation of the
Family Health Strategy (FHS) in 1994, which was de-
signed to expand the coverage of primary health care
(PHC) with an emphasis on whole-person care and the
social context, and to provide a first point of contact
with the broader health system.
In practice, the FHS is based on Family Health Teams
(FHT) composed of a doctor, nurse, nurse assistant, and
four to six community health workers, organized by geo-
graphic regions, with each team providing PHC to
around 1000 families (about 3500 people). The teams
are either based in Basic Care Units or operate from
purpose-built Family Health Clinics that host several
FHT. The FHT are expected to provide comprehensive
and integrated primary health care to the target popula-
tion, through services provided at the facility and out-
reach activities.
Since its launch, coverage of the FHS has expanded
rapidly across the country. There are currently over 35
000 FHT, present in 96 % of municipalities, and with an
estimated national population coverage of 57 % accord-
ing to the Department for Basic Care (Ministry of
Health, DAB database).1 Priority expansion of services
into more rural, poorer municipalities, and to poorer
communities within them, has enhanced equity of ac-
cess. Utilization rates have risen across all states and
particularly in those with lower levels of income. The
FHS has also affected the way Brazilians use public ser-
vices, reducing the role of hospitals as the “usual source
of care” (from 35 % in 1998 to 21 % in 2008) and in-
creasing reliance on PHC facilities (from 42 % to 57 %
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over the same period) [13]. Several studies have also
demonstrated that the FHS has had a significant impact
on outcomes, including infant mortality [9].
After a rapid expansion over the first 10 years of imple-
mentation, coverage started to stagnate around 2006, in
particular in larger municipalities and metropolitan areas.
In addition, there has been growing concern with the
quality of care. One of the key constraints to expanding
coverage and improving quality are the human resource
management arrangements in the public sector.
As part of the decentralization of the SUS, municipalities
have responsibility for management and delivery of the
FHS and are required to adhere to constitutional norms
and public law on employment (recruitment, contracting,
and payment of professionals) and services. Direct employ-
ment options are limited to three types of contracts (as
defined by the constitution and administrative law):
 Public civil servant contracts are permanent
positions that must be contracted through public
competitions (merit-based).
 Temporary contracts are allowed under
circumstances of “exceptional public interest,” the
definition of which is contested and malleable.
 Commissioned positions are reserved for directorial
or high-level managerial functions.
In all cases, levels of remuneration are defined by the
municipality. However, salaries are harmonized within
municipalities, and there is limited scope for variation
across specialization, geographic location, or perform-
ance. In addition to the direct constraints on public hir-
ing, other federal laws, such as the Law of Fiscal
Responsibility (Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal) which
limit municipal spending on personnel to a maximum of
60 % of the municipal budget, also indirectly present
barriers to expanding social services. Furthermore, the
geographic and sector distribution of medical doctors is
marked by inequalities, as many physicians work in
urban areas in the private sector or in specialized care.
In 2010, 1304 municipalities had a shortage of physi-
cians, especially those in rural, peri-urban, or difficult-
to-access areas [5, 8]. There is also an overall shortage of
medical doctors with an interest and appropriate qualifi-
cations for working in primary care, particularly in
underserved parts of the country, due to the relatively
lower salaries and the mainly public hiring of primary
health care positions, as compared with other specialties.
This results in limited attraction for medical graduates
to specialize in PHC specialties as there is, for example,
a persistent surplus of family health medical residence
positions [1].
Given these challenges, many states and municipalities
started searching for ways to circumvent public sector
rigidities that hampered expansion of primary health
care coverage. Contracting out the provision of health
services has emerged as one option, and initiatives have
been adopted throughout the country.
New contracting modalities in the health sector
Recognizing the need to increase flexibility in public
contracting and service provision, the Programa Nacio-
nal de Publicização was approved as part of the State
Reform process in 1998. The law authorized the transfer
of responsibility for running public services and manage-
ment of public goods and personnel to a specific set of
qualified entities, including Organizações Sociais or OS,
civil society organizations (Organização da Sociedade
Civil de Interesse Público—OSCIP), nongovernmental or-
ganizations, philanthropic organizations, cooperatives,
and private companies. The objective of the reform was
to create a mechanism for facilitating the transfer of cer-
tain activities from the state to the private sector. It
would be a new form of partnership that called upon the
“third sector” (i.e., neither public nor private) to provide
services of social interest and public use, but that do not
necessarily need to be undertaken by public bodies.
One form of contracting that has emerged as particu-
larly important for the health sector is that of OS. For-
mally, OS are legal entities under private law, operate on
a not-for-profit basis, carry out activities of social value,
and operate in partnership with the state. They are pri-
marily financed by public funds and must adopt govern-
ance arrangements that allow for state representation.
They are subject to public audit (by the Tribunal de
Contas) and ministerial supervision.
The first experiences with the contracting of OS was
in science and technology, with some laboratory services
contracted out immediately after the new legislation in
1998. The state of São Paulo was also an early adopter
of the OS model as a more flexible alternative for hiring
professionals while incorporating private sector manage-
ment practices, initially focusing on the health sector.
The state contracted the management of some hospital
services in 1998, and today, OS are involved in most as-
pects of health service delivery.
Over the last decade, some states in Brazil have also
pursued other options for improving the delivery of
health services. Specifically, the possibility of using State
Foundations started in 2005, when the federal govern-
ment, through the Ministry of Planning, Budget and
Management and the Ministry of Health, and aided by
the National School of Public Health and a group of
lawyers, began studying broader legal and institutional
options for overcoming the rigidities in the health sys-
tem [7]. State Foundations are decentralized administra-
tive institutions that carry out public activities and
provide social services. A key difference between a State
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Foundation and an OS is that a State Foundation is a
public (state-owned) institution, albeit operating under
private law (including for contracting and managing
staff ), whereas an OS is a privately owned institution.
Third-party contracting of medical doctors in PHC is
still limited, accounting for fewer than 7 % of all contracts,
with OS being the most popular alternative (Fig. 1). Per-
manent public civil servant contracts or other forms of
public contract (temporary or commissioned positions)
are the predominant form of contracting of medical doc-
tors in PHC (nearly 80 % of all doctors), but irregular
forms of contracting through stipends and other means
are also significant in many states.
This paper looks at two particularly noteworthy expe-
riences: that of creating a State Foundation (Fundação
Estatal) in the state of Bahia and contracting with OS
(Organizações Sociais) in the city of Rio de Janeiro. In
both cases, the aim was to expand PHC in underserved
areas and improve performance through enhanced ac-
countability and more flexible management, but other-
wise, the experiences from the two locations were very
different, as were the results (see Table 1 for a compari-
son of the two models).
Methods
The two case studies were chosen for their importance
in defining new milestones in human resource contract-
ing for health in Brazil. Although they aim to overcome
the same constraints, the two models represent different
modalities of contracting and were implemented in dif-
ferent contexts. The selection of case studies was based
on the recent trends in the contracting for PHC in Brazil
as the OS and the State Foundations are the current
dominant modalities of contracting models in the coun-
try. The paper does not aim, however, to compare the
two experiences given the differences in the contexts, in-
stitutional framework, and, particularly, lack of adequate
data to control for these differences. The objective is to
provide a detailed analysis of each experience to high-
light their strengths and weakness that may have influ-
enced the observed outcomes.
Fig. 1 Contracting modalities for doctors in primary care (2013, by state)
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This study used a mixed-method study design that in-
cluded both quantitative and qualitative data collection
and analysis. Data collection processes included three
stages: firstly, a literature review was undertaken. This
review included published literature as well as legislation
(laws, decrees, ordinances, resolutions, and operational
norms defined by different levels of government). This
literature review followed the narrative methodology,
searching from scientific publication databases (PubMed,
Scopus, and ISI Web of Knowledge) and the gray litera-
ture retrieved from searches in generic search engines
such as Google. The main search keywords were “pri-
mary care” and “contracting.”
Secondly, secondary data on different dimensions of
health care provision and outcomes were collected. The
secondary data originated from the Brazilian official
health care information systems, which are routinely col-
lected, recorded, and stored by the Informatics Depart-
ment at the Ministry of Health (Departamento de
Informática do SUS—DATASUS). Those are the only
sources of information that cover the entire period con-
sidered in this study, for the indicators chosen. All data
were collected from August to September 2013, covering
the period 2007–2013.
The third step consisted of in-depth unstructured in-
terviews with key informants from the Secretariat of
Health (Rio de Janeiro) and the Secretariat of Health and
State Foundation (Bahia). The key informants were re-
cruited based on their participation in the process of de-
fining new contracting rules. As civil servants, with no
financial interests in contracting modalities, they were
regarded as free from conflict of interest. In the case of
the Rio de Janeiro Secretariat, the three informants were
part of the team responsible for managing the FHS in
the municipality.
Data analysis consisted of (i) qualitative descriptive
analysis for the document research and in-depth inter-
views. Particular attention was paid to management, fi-
nancing, and service provision issues such as human
resources, performance monitoring, and management
(For the in-depth interviews, content analysis was car-
ried out by repeated reading of the transcribed inter-
views in order to codify and analyze the data by theme.)
and (ii) quantitative analysis of the secondary data in
order to construct a statistical diagnosis of the current
state of primary health care in the State of Bahia and the
Municipality of Rio de Janeiro.
A complete list of the research themes, indicators, data
sources, and type of analysis can be found in Additional
file 1.
Results
Bahia case study: the State Foundation experience
In January 2007, after an extensive consultative process
with stakeholders from the executive and judiciary, as
well as civil society, the Bahia State Health Secretariat or
SESAB (Secretaria de Estado da Saúde da Bahia) pro-
posed the State Foundation as the most appropriate so-
lution for attracting and retaining health professionals
that would reduce the proportion of temporary and ir-
regular work contracts and overcome public sector
rigidities.
Table 1 Comparison of contracting models
Bahia Rio de Janeiro
When started 2009 2009
Contracting entity Participating municipalities and the state
government of Bahia
Municipality of Rio de Janeiro
Contracted entity/entities State Foundation Social Organizations
Stated aims To formalize and expand employment in
primary care and improve quality
Provide primary health services
Main responsibilities of contracted entity Hiring and training of professional and
management support to primary care
Hiring and managing complete Family Health Teams
and the services they provide in facilities provided by
the municipality
Full-service management No Yes
Legal regime Private law Private law
Employment regime Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT)a CLT
Ownership Public Private
Supervision Office of the Comptroller Generalb Office of the Comptroller General
Funding Public Public
Source: Compiled by the authors
aCLT is the main piece of legislation relating to Brazilian labor law and procedural labor law. It was created in 1943, unifying all the existing labor legislation in
Brazil. Its main aim is the regulation of individual and collective labor relations. Other labor laws, such as for those working as legal entities (Pessoa Jurídica),
independent/freelance contract workers, or public civil servants, are covered under a federal statutory legal regime
bCGU (Controladoria-Geral da União) or “Comptroller General” is the federal agency responsible for technical supervision, internal control, and public audit
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A State Foundation is a state-owned, not-for-profit in-
stitution that integrates indirect public administration,
but operates within private law, with a mix of private-
and public sector governance mechanisms, such as
employment contracts. Its legal basis is similar to a
state-owned company, except that it functions in the so-
cial rather than economic domain, and hence, it may not
commercialize its services on the market.
The Family Health State Foundation or FESF (Funda-
ção Estatal Saúde da Família) was designed as a strategy
for municipalities with the greatest problems in attract-
ing and retaining health professionals and improving the
quality of PHC in a coordinated manner. It entailed a
tripartite contract between the participating municipal-
ities, the state, and the foundation. Municipal participa-
tion was optional, but the benefits of greater stability
and quality of services provided were expected to en-
courage mayors to participate.
The most important function of the FESF was to con-
tract health professionals, in particular doctors, nurses,
and dentists, for PHC on behalf of participating munici-
palities. All recruitment by the FESF was governed by
the Plan for Employment, Careers and Salaries (Plano de
Empregos, Carreiras e Salários), which established public
competitive processes and formal labor contracts that
allow for mobility across health teams, for career ad-
vancement by merit, for continuing education, and for
employment stability. This was a pioneering feature of
the FESF that was explicitly designed to address the
challenges faced by many municipalities in attracting
staff by offering both financial and career incentives for
professionals to accept positions in underserved areas.
The FESF was also expected to provide support to
participating municipalities for the management and
organization of FHT and the development of primary
health care, including training, supervision, and the
introduction of management practices supporting quality
improvement in primary care.
The FESF was formally created in July 2009. At that
time, a total of 256 mayors (61 %) signed Terms of Com-
mitment and Adherence to the FESF and 110 (26 %) pro-
ceeded to pass authorizing laws. However, when the
contracting process began in September 2009, which
entailed signing technical cooperation agreements and
management contracts between the municipalities and
FESF, only 40 municipalities (10 %) actually contracted the
FESF to hire health professionals.
Of the 40 municipalities contracted in 2009, only 12
(3 %) still had contracts in 2014, accounting for 22 doc-
tors, 38 nurses, and 28 dentists. Due to municipalities’ low
participation, the FESF contracted only around 180 FHT,
well below the earlier expectation of 1000. The number of
staff contracted by the FESF peaked in late 2011 and
started declining in mid- to late 2012 (Fig. 2). By late
2012, the default rate on management contracts with mu-
nicipalities reached 80 % of revenues.
Beyond trying to centralize and coordinate the con-
tracting of health professionals for FHT, the FESF
intended to increase the quality of services through vari-
ous strategies.
First, the professionals hired by FESF were expected to
be better qualified for their positions as a result of a
more rigorous hiring process. Moreover, the conditions
offered by the FESF (stability, social security, career de-
velopment, etc.) were also expected to help attract quali-
fied professionals.
Second, professionals hired by the FESF underwent
6 months of compulsory (and remunerated) training. All
FESF professionals were offered continuing education
for specialization or masters programs.
Third, health professionals contracted by the FESF
were also offered performance incentives. This was a
bonus of 25–50 % of base salary, paid monthly,
dependent on meeting the goals set by the FESF. These
goals were monitored quantitatively and qualitatively
through a dedicated PHC Monitoring System, with pay-
ment based on the number of days worked and results.
Fourth, all contracts between municipalities and/or the
state with the FESF included targets and goals, to which
a 10 % variable portion of payments from municipalities
to the FESF was linked. The evaluation of the targets
and goals was based on trimestral reports drafted and
sent by the FESF to the Monitoring and Evaluation
Commission.
Rio de Janeiro case study: the Social Organization
experience
Until recently, health care in the city of Rio de Janeiro re-
lied heavily on an extensive hospital network, including fa-
cilities under federal, state, and municipal management,
but had very limited primary health care provision. In
2009, the municipality launched the Saúde Presente pro-
gram aimed at expanding FHS coverage. In order to es-
chew cumbersome public procedures, the municipality
constructed purpose-built clinics for several FHT but
contracted out the staffing and clinical management to
OS. The municipality continued to promote and exercise
strategic control over the social actions through entering
into management contracts with OS, with which perform-
ance targets were agreed to ensure the quality and effect-
iveness of services.
All contracts between OS and the municipality of Rio
de Janeiro were standardized. The contracts contained a
defined set of health services that were to be managed,
maintained, and equipped with human resources by the
OS. The only difference between contracts was the geo-
graphic area covered. Contracts were signed for 2 years
and were renewable if at least 80 % of the objectives and
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goals were met. The contracts defined a fixed payment
based on number of health teams and an estimate of re-
sources required to cover the Portfolio of Basic Services,
as well as a variable, performance-based payment linked
to three sets of indicators: incentives paid to the OS
based on productivity and quality of service targets, in-
centives paid to health units based on specific agreed in-
dicators, and incentives paid to health workers. Health
units were required to produce trimestral reports relat-
ing to agreed indicators.
In May 2009, the law paving the way for the contract-
ing of OS in Rio de Janeiro was enacted and tendering
opened immediately. To date, six OS have won tenders
to manage FHT in 10 geographical areas. However, only
five are still in operation as one of the contracts was
canceled due to not meeting minimum standards, and
the contract for that territory was passed to another OS.
Since contracting with OS started, Family Health Clinics
have been implanted all over Rio de Janeiro, primarily by
the construction of new clinics (85 new units since
2009) but also by converting Basic Health Units into
Family Clinics (49 units that existed before 2009).
The financial reports of the OS were only available as
from 2012. They showed a concentration in the hiring of
community health agents, doctors, nurses, nurse techni-
cians, and administrators. This was to be expected as
the FHS assumes a large number of community health
agents working over small territories in direct contact
with the families within them. Equally, doctors, nurses,
and nurse technicians form the base of FHT, as are ad-
ministrators that help manage them. The OS did not en-
counter any problems in attracting professionals. In fact,
a critical feature of the OS model was the simplified hir-
ing and the flexibility to pay differentiated (and higher)
salaries. The significantly higher salaries for the more
qualified positions facilitated hiring and hence created
the conditions for the expansion that has been observed.
The new Family Health Clinics were successful in rap-
idly increasing coverage (Fig. 3), in part due to the char-
acteristics of Rio de Janeiro whereby large populations
live in favelas. The clinics were implanted in under-
served areas with a high population density. They were
in most cases large and included multiple FHT and in
some cases incorporated laboratories, x-ray facilities,
and other services.
The expansion of the FHS in Rio de Janeiro was ex-
pected to result in improved coverage of priority inter-
ventions (antenatal care, management of patients with
chronic diseases, etc.) and, ultimately, improved out-
comes. It is still early to assess the extent to which these
goals have been achieved. Nonetheless, available data
suggest that relative to 2007, the municipality has seen a
near doubling of PHC consultations, a large increase in
the number of chronic disease patients under active
management, and a reduction in avoidable admission
from diabetes and associated complications. However,
there has only been a modest increase in the share of
pregnant women with seven or more prenatal consulta-
tions (Table 2).
The contracting of OS was also intended to improve
performance due to their increased management cap-
acity and flexibility as well as the introduction of per-
formance incentives for both professionals and health
facilities. By 2013, however, the performance incentive
modality had not operated as planned, since the pay-
ment of the variable part of the funding appeared dis-
connected to achieving the targets: the data available
indicate that targets had not been met, while the variable
Fig. 2 Number of health care workers contracted by the FESF
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funding had been paid. This was likely to do with prob-
lems of information collection rather than poor quality
care, and increased reporting of targets in 2013 indicated
that reporting was improving. In addition, there also ap-
peared to be distortions with respect to the financing of
incentives. The municipality transferred the variable part
of the funding to the OS regardless of their performance.
The OS, on the other hand, were able to retain these
funds if the Family Clinics did not attain their targets
and goals. While any retained incentive funds were fore-
seen to be invested in the health facilities most in need,
the fact that the OS stood to capitalize on the poor per-
formance of the Family Clinics they ran represented dis-
incentives for performance and quality.
Discussion
Bahia case study
Implementation of the FHS in Bahia started in 1997 and
since then has been the principal strategy for strengthen-
ing PHC in the state. Since its introduction, FHS coverage
has increased continuously, reaching all municipalities
and 60 % population coverage by 2011 [2]. Nevertheless,
Bahia, like other states in the Northeast, lags behind the
rest of Brazil on socioeconomic development, and many
municipalities have faced challenges in attracting and
retaining health professionals, as well as competition
between municipalities for scarce human resources. More-
over, as a result of contractual arrangements, accountabil-
ity for performance (e.g., complying with the 40 h a week
requirement for doctors) has often been weak and there
has been little systematic effort to ensure opportunities for
continuing education for health professionals in PHC fa-
cilities [7]. By centralizing the hiring of professionals for
primary health across the state, the FESF intended to
create economies of scale and help reduce competi-
tion between municipalities and the high rotation of
professionals.
There are a number of reasons for the lower than ex-
pected participation by municipalities in the FESF. One
concerned costs. The fact that FESF offered stable con-
tracts with social security benefits and competitive salar-
ies meant that the cost of hiring professionals through
the FESF was comparatively expensive. In addition, the
expected economies of scale did not materialize. As a re-
sult, administrative costs for participating municipalities
were high, and the FESF was not able to achieve bar-
gaining power in the state labor market. Some muni-
cipalities were also reluctant to surrender their
autonomy to hire and manage their publicly employed
health professionals.
Fig. 3 Estimates of FHS coverage, in Rio de Janeiro, 2006–2013
Table 2 Trends in key indicators in Rio de Janeiro municipalities (2007–2013)
2007 2013 % change
Population 6 178 762 6 429 923 4
Primary health care consultations 3 566 747 6 846 453 92
Pregnant women with 7 or more prenatal consultations 68.5 % 70.8 % 3
Number of diabetics under management 125 317 231 960 85
Number of hypertensive patients under management 544 414 791 951 45
Avoidable admission: diabetes and complications 3.6 % 1.0 % −71
Source: Official administrative data provided by the Health Secretariat of Rio de Janeiro Municipality
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One of the main reasons for the decline in participa-
tion of the FESF has been the high proportion of
municipality-FESF contract defaults. Many municipal-
ities were not transferring funds to the FESF, partly due
to a perception that the costs were too high, and yet
retained the staff until their contracts were terminated
thus defaulting on management contracts. In addition,
municipal elections were held at the end of 2012 that
changed management in some municipalities, to the det-
riment of participation with FESF.
Other external factors also impinged upon the appeal
of the FESF, such as the simultaneous implementation of
other national programs aimed at supplying medical staff
to underserved areas. In particular, the Program for the
Enhancement of Professionals in PHC or PROVAB (Pro-
grama de Valorização dos Profissionais na Atenção
Básica) that offers a practical 1-year postgraduate course
in family health by placing doctors in underserved loca-
tions and, more recently, the “More Doctors” program
(Mais Médicos) that attracts Brazilian and foreign doc-
tors to underserved areas and requires medical students
to undertake 2 years in medical residency in PHC facil-
ities as a precondition to graduation, both of which led
some municipalities to dismiss FESF-hired professionals
in preference for professionals hired under these pro-
grams at lower cost.
The impact of the FESF on the quality of primary
health care is difficult to assess, in part due to the recent
and limited scope of implementation and because con-
tracting with the FESF was voluntary and the participat-
ing municipalities are not necessarily comparable to
other municipalities. However, the recent performance
evaluation of PHC under the National Program for the
Improvement in Access and Quality of Primary Health
Care or PMAQ (Programa Nacional de Melhoria do
Acesso e da Qualidade) found that teams with current
FESF staff have consistently better ratings. The differ-
ences cannot be causally linked to the FESF, but inter-
viewees attributed the better results to the institutional
support offered by the FESF to the municipalities [2].
The future of the FESF
The FESF model depended on a significant share of mu-
nicipalities in the state contracting out human resource
management in PHC to the foundation, but for a range
of reasons, this did not happen, and over time, the num-
ber of municipalities doing so declined even further. The
leadership of the FESF undertook an administrative and
governance reform to reduce administrative costs, seek-
ing to strengthen the focus on quality, productivity, and
efficiency by finding a balance between administrative
costs for the number of employees and ensuring an ap-
propriate administrative structure for strategic planning
and management for results.
In practice, the FESF was obliged to diversify its activ-
ities from contracting the workforce to include a con-
tract with the State Health Secretariat-SESAB to hire
professionals to develop its home care services linked to
the state hospital network, regulatory activities, institu-
tional support to PMAQ, and other services. Hence, al-
though the FESF continues to engage on primary health
and work with municipalities, staff for the FHS only
accounted for 6 % of employees in 2013, and only 25 %
of foundation revenues come from municipalities.
Rio de Janeiro case study
Rio de Janeiro is the second largest city in Brazil (6 mil-
lion inhabitants). For many years, the hospital network
ensured access to basic care through outpatient depart-
ments and emergency rooms, as well as critical inpatient
services and specialist care. However, access to the
poorer segments of the population has long been prob-
lematic and has become increasingly so as the popula-
tion and health care needs have grown. Moreover, the
hospital network does not provide preventive services or
health promotion, and integration and coordination of
care has been weak.
In light of the remarkable expansion of FHS coverage
from around 10 % in 2008 to 41 % in 2013, the contract-
ing of OS can be considered a great success, especially
taking into account that many of the Family Health
Clinics were constructed from scratch. It can also be
said that this reform in the provision of primary health
care has succeeded in attracting significant amounts of
government funding to the health sector and in particu-
lar a huge increase in primary health spending.
Contracting with OS is an interesting model that is
based on longer term relationships between the organi-
zations and the municipality. The model requires a high-
level of cooperation given that they share responsibilities
in primary care, with the municipality responsible for
policy and providing the infrastructure, while the OS
manage the provision of care and supply of basic drugs
and some equipment.
The close relationship has provided conditions for
close monitoring and problem-solving and may have
contributed to improving performance in ways that are
hard to measure. On the other hand, the harder forms
of performance accountability envisaged in the contract,
in particular performance-based variable payments, still
need to be fine-tuned in order to establish a mechanism
that delivers on its intended aims and is workable, with-
out inadvertently giving rise to distortions of incentives.
The model has also introduced a potentially problem-
atic dynamic between health workers with regard to
compensation. Currently, despite the standardized con-
tracts between the municipality and the OS, there is no
apparent link between the resources received by OS per
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contract and the salaries they pay. In fact, wage inequal-
ity exists across the whole primary health network in
Rio de Janeiro. Salary disparities exist between public of-
ficials assigned to OS and professionals directly hired by
them and between professionals hired by different OS
but within the same professional category, as well as be-
tween professionals working in different geographical lo-
cations. OS covering more remote and often poorer
areas of the city tend to pay lower salaries. They are
therefore more prone to hiring the less qualified, youn-
ger professionals for shorter periods of time. Thus, argu-
ably, the introduction of OS has increased the inequality
within the primary health system from the traditional
management model that had standardized levels of pay.
Financial data, however, has only been available since
2012, and therefore, the effects of such wage differentials
have yet to be determined but may negatively impact the
provision of care.
Although it is probably safe to say that the municipal-
ity would not have been able to expand coverage to the
extent it has based on the traditional model, some of the
gains in terms of quality and effectiveness of PHC may
have as much to do with the Family Clinic model (com-
bining multiple teams in purpose-built facilities) as with
the OS model. In other words, the ability to hire and
manage staff in a flexible way has been an important
gain, but the extent to which the contracting out of
management of facilities as opposed to simply providing
staff is an important aspect of the model is not clear.
There is also insufficient data on costs and efficiency
to assess the merit of the OS model relative to alterna-
tives. This is partly an issue of the costs of increased sal-
aries, but also, administrative costs must also be taken
into account, both within the OS as well as within the
municipality. Assessments of efficiency and perform-
ance, however, must take a comprehensive analysis of
performance. For instance, higher salary and administra-
tive costs may be justifiable if associated with increased
productivity and quality of care.
Discussion of both studies
In terms of achieving the goals of expanding coverage
and improving the quality of PHC services, the picture
emerging from the two cases is mixed. The municipality
of Rio de Janeiro successfully managed to expand the
coverage of primary health care through the FHS. This
expansion, in turn, has been associated with a large in-
crease in the utilization of PHC services, which is ex-
pected to contribute to improved outcomes over the
longer term. Inevitably, a number of implementation is-
sues remain, in particular concerning the collection and
compilation of data on costs and performance, which is
a critical element of the system of performance-related
financial incentives that form part of the contract
between the municipality and the OS. At this point,
there is limited basis on which to assess the quality of
OS performance and to compare services provided by
OS with those delivered based on alternative models.
In the case of Bahia, the FESF managed to contract a
number of health professionals for participating munici-
palities, contributing to an expansion of coverage in
these locations. However, despite a high level of initial
support, the number of municipalities that actually
established a contract with the FESF when it was created
was very low and has fallen further since. As a result,
the intended economies of scale were not achieved,
undermining the appeal of the model for municipalities.
There are some indications that the FESF has contrib-
uted to improved performance where it is operating, but
data are limited and by no means conclusive [2].
In assessing contracting experiences and comparing
them against other approaches, performance in terms of
coverage and quality is important, but the cost implica-
tions of the approach also need to be considered. It is
often claimed that contracting will improve the technical
efficiency of service delivery, although such gains may be
partially offset by increases in administrative and trans-
action costs. However, evidence on these dimensions of
contracting experiences if often scant, as is also the case
for these two Brazilian cases. There is some limited evi-
dence that the productivity of health providers has in-
creased due to performance incentives and new forms of
management. In both models, personnel costs have,
however, increased, although this would perhaps have
been required in the alternative models as well in order
to attract staff. Although there is currently very little in-
formation on administrative costs associated with the re-
spective models, it is clear that both the FESF and the
OS incur nontrivial administrative costs and there are
also transaction costs to be considered in state and mu-
nicipal administration related to monitoring and over-
sight of contracts.
Given the differences in the institutional and imple-
mentation arrangements, as well as the different socio-
economic context, it is not possible to make a direct
comparison between the two models. On the other
hand, it is possible to compare with the situation before
the contracting arrangements were implemented in
Bahia and Rio de Janeiro. In both cases, the experi-
ences managed to achieve expansion of PHC cover-
age; however, the FESF model did not sustain this
expansion given the reduction in the number of mu-
nicipalities with contracts. The analysis provides some
plausible hypothesis to explain this, as, for example,
the fact that FESF was more vulnerable to changes in
the political scenarios or the loss of autonomy in hir-
ing and managing the workforce by the municipalities
contracting with FESF.
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Conclusions
The OS model has a relatively long history in Brazil and is
increasingly used for staffing and managing health care
provision in different parts of Brazil. Experiences to date
have shown that it takes time for the approach to mature,
with the need for significant capacity on both the OS and
government side (management of services, design of con-
tracts, monitoring of costs and performance, oversight,
etc.). Nonetheless, as OS with a focus on health care be-
come more plentiful and experienced, and with continued
pressures to contain civil service wage bills at the state
and municipal level, the approach will likely continue to
grow, in particular in larger municipalities.
The State Foundation model brings some important
advantages but has suffered from significant implemen-
tation problems. Some of these are related to the com-
plex governance and contracting arrangements that arise
between the foundation, the state, and the municipal-
ities. However, the foundation model has also, for better
or worse, been undermined by federal initiatives such as
Mais Médicos, which emerged to address some of the
same problems that the FESF was expected to help solve.
The future of the foundation model for PHC in Bahia
and elsewhere hence depends in large part on how it re-
lates to federal human resource initiatives and on how
efforts to diversify into other areas will permit the FESF
to maintain a significant focus on primary care.
In both cases, there is a need to carry out rigorous as-
sessments. However, this will require the implementa-
tion of reliable and accurate information systems that, as
of yet, are not in place. Medium-term indicators are ne-
cessary for the measurement of the effectiveness of the
system while long-term indicators are needed for the as-
sessment of the impact on the morbidity and mortality
of the population covered.
Endnotes
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determined by a person’s residence within the defined
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